Kate Crowe ring true, and it is undeniable that two of the chief purveyors, against whom Catherwood inveighed, were ignominiously dismissed from the service in 1822, "having been guilty of fraudulent practices and gross misconduct in the Peninsula.""1
In particulars too, Catherwood can be shown to be telling the truth, however incredible it may seem. He claimed first of all that the financial system was by its very nature open to abuse. The purveyors were responsible for supplying and maintaining the general hospitals of the army-they had to repair and keep the buildings used for this purpose clean, provide all food and drink, medicines, equipment and changes of linen, pay the wages of hospital servants and labourers, keep all accounts and provide necessary stationery.
Many supplies were sent from England, conveyed up-country by the commissariat, and delivered over to the purveyors in return for requisitions signed by senior officers, and receipts; but throughout the war, perishable goods such as foodstuffs, and urgently-needed replacements, as well as the cost of services, had to be bought or paid for in the country, and for this the purveyors naturally required ready money. This was obtained from two sources, known as the cash and the stoppage accounts. The first was fairly simple: the purveyor-general submitted an estimate of the expenses of the general hospitals for the coming month, and applied through the inspector of hospitals at headquarters to the military secretary for that sum. In 1812-1814 the monthly estimate was between £20,0O-25,000, and it was always forthcoming, as Wellington gave the hospitals financial priority.
The second source was rather more complicated. Each soldier had 6d. stopped from his pay each day in payment for his ration of food. When he was taken to a general hospital, however, 9d. was stopped from his pay to cover the cost of his food and that of medical comforts such as port wine, fresh fruit and milk. Clerks or servants went round the wards each day and took notes of the names and regiments of the patients, which information was transmitted to the regimental paymasters, checked against their own records of absences, and the amount owing to the medical department was thus calculated and credited to its account at the military chest. This was a paper transaction; pay was so much in arrears that the paymasters could do no more than inform the medical department that had the money been available, so much would have been to its credit; while the purveyors in turn spent up to the limit of the sum to which they were entitled, paid when they could, and asked their creditors to wait for the remainder. Minor assistants, such as washerwomen and labourers, were paid with the minimum of delay, but shopkeepers and merchants usually received something on account and were asked to wait, they being better able to extend credit. Each transaction had to be accounted for by bills and signed receipts, and these vouchers were periodically made up into returns, which had to be scrutinized by senior medical as well as purveying officers. But the unscrupulous could find an abundance of ways of nullifying these checks, and it might even be said that elaborations in the system merely acted as a spur to criminal ingenuity.
Each day an abstract was drawn up of the different foodstuffs required for the diets of the sick, and these formed the basis for the weekly and monthly returns.
T. B. Catherwood and the medical department of Wellington's army But such abstracts needed no alteration to benefit the purveyors. They were in charge of the storekeepers whose duty was to issue food and extras such as lemons, sugar, etc., to the ward-masters, and by the use of false weights and measures, the patients could be fobbed off with smaller amounts than those actually prescribed by the doctors. Spirits could be watered and tea and sugar were often dampened to increase their weight. The difference was euphemistically termed a surplus, which the deputypurveyor could sell, either retaining the profit or sharing it with the storekeeper. The latter, remarked Catherwood, is "considered more or less fitted for his employment according to the quantity of surplus that he can create."12 Perhaps Catherwood is exaggerating here to some extent. No doubt these minor frauds went on, but as they were more easily detected than other stratagems, they were a less attractive way of making money. As was remarked during the post-war investigations, "it was ever considered by the purveyors as a circumstance of consequence that no ground of complaint, either as to the quantity or quality of provisions should exist, as any reports of such a nature being made to the medical officers, must have led to investigations, which were ever studiously avoided."13
Nor was there any need for the purveyor to run such risks, for as Catherwood explained, they could make enormous profits with the minimum of effort when large quantities of goods were bought in the country. He said that it was customary for the officer in question to buy only what was required, but that he would persuade the merchant "to make a bill for the quantity for the employment of which he had obtained a voucher, and to annex a receipt for the value of those quantities, and thus he obtains a voucher for the payment of a larger quantity of money than he has really paid, and the value of the surplus provisions goes in the first instance into his pocket. These surplus provisions form the principal sources of the profits of a purveyor, and the amount not only would astonish one unacquainted with the department, but have more than once exercised the credulity of the chief of the department himself."'14 As long as the merchants received the money they had bargained for, claimed Catherwood, they would sign almost anything, and he cited one named Venancio who signed otherwise blank bills for the convenience of one of the purveyors.
Later investigations proved that Catherwood's accusations were founded in factindeed, that there were countless instances of such fraud. When asked if he was paid the exact amount of his account, a merchant of Abrantes replied that he was paid "exactly what was due to him, but that he received more money because the deputy purveyors inserted in his accounts larger quantities of articles, and some articles besides which he had not furnished, saying they had purchased this, and for this reason he returned them the difference between his account and those of the hospital."' 5 A clerk named Edward Fairman, when employed to detect frauds in the documents brought before the Audit Office, also declared that "the contractors were always ready to sign away papers put before them on the receipt of the amount of their 
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Kate Crowe Another Portuguese, asked why he had signed as a witness to an account, although he had nothing to do with the man to whom the money was paid, declared that he had "signed without knowing what he signed, and it was well known to him that frequently papers were carried about to the coffee houses to be signed."17 Lewis Moreira, interrogated as to the name of a witness on his accounts, admitted that he thought he was "a man taken at random to sign ... as was the customary practice."18
Most of the Portuguese submitted accounts in their own language, but signed accounts in English whenever requested to do so, and according to Manoel Dias of Coimbra, the former were destroyed as soon as they had been compared with the latter, and the English receipt signed.'9
It was noticed in 1821 that "many persons swore that the signatures to receipts purporting to have been given by them were false, and that no such receipts ever had been signed by them."20 Francisco Jose Vieira, for example, when confronted with nine accounts accredited to him, acknowledged the signature to eight but declared the ninth false; and he disavowed having supplied such articles as wood, saying that "the purveyors sent for him to sign those accounts, and in truth he signed everything 'na boa fe!!' [in good faith]."2'
Besides inflated and false accounts, the purveyors are shown to have evaded treasury regulations in other ways. Bills were supposed to be supported by a certificate from a man of good character, to the effect that the prices therein stated corresponded to the fair market price. But Antonio Cartacho, whose signature appeared on fifteen such certificates, told the auditor-general that "he signed everything without enquiry, being told that it was a form practised on such occasions."22 When a new hospital was set up, the purveyor was charged with the job of making the available accommodation habitable. A surplus could be obtained from the cost of the materials, and the workmen could be tricked into signing lists which showed them to have worked longer than they actually had. The laundry lists could be falsified by inflating the number of items on the bills which would undergo scrutiny, and examination of various laundresses showed this to have taken place. Maria Clara and Maria Rita, both washerwomen who worked for the Estrela hospital in Lisbon, declared that they "never received anything like"23 the sum which appeared on their accounts. Four bills for the year 1810 were for 547,670 reis (£154), 68,450 reis (£19), 655,705 reis (£184) and 269,105 reis (L76),24 whereas the women said that the largest sum paid to them was about 10 moedas (£13 lOs. Od.).25 It turned out that they had only had charge of the linen for the last three years of the war, but that Maria Clara had signed receipts for washing for the whole period: she explained to the auditorgeneral that "they sent for her to the Estrela hospital and presented to her all the 17 
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T. B. Catherwood and the medical department of Wellington's army receipts for washing to sign, which she did na boafe; so much so that on one occasion she remained a whole afternoon signing receipts, and when she had done, they gave her 800 reis" [4s. 6d.] .26
Catherwood said that it was especially easy to defraud the government over the wages of the hospital servants, for daily records were not kept of their employment -for the sake of neatness, one clerk was told to write up the accounts at the end of the month-making them up would have been the more accurate description of his work. The occasional false name was slipped in, but the usual ploy was to show them to have worked longer hours than was in fact the case. This job, remarked Catherwood, was often given "to the clerk employed in the victualling branch, as a reward for his fitness in that employment".27 Edward Fairman, who had taken an active part in defrauding the government, later admitted that he was well "aware of the frauds which took place in the Servants' Pay Lists."28
The stationery accounts formed an irresistible source of outdoor relief for the undeserving poor, as requisitions were not checked until after supplies had been bought. The medical board in London was itself partly to blame, because its members refused to send out the amounts required. Britain was suffering from a serious paper shortage throughout the. war, so that supplies were often hard to come by and very expensive. The board, in a misguided if understandable attempt at economy, restricted quotas to unrealistic levels, thereby "occasioning the purchase of large quantities at exorbitant prices abroad."29 Towards the end of the war, the stationery accounts had become so inflated that McGrigor put his foot down and refused to allow any more purchases of books and paper in the Peninsula at public expense.
The financial system of the general hospitals was obviously in need of reform, but its liability to abuse could have been surmounted if the officers engaged in its administration had been better supervised. It was expected that some would try to line their own pockets, but when two of the senior purveyors were themselves guilty of flagrant dishonesty, which Catherwood describes in great detail, they set the tone for the rest of their subordinates, who then knew that their activities would be condoned and even protected from investigation, lest embarrassing facts should be uncovered and prove the ruin of all. Joseph Gunson was the head of the purveyor's department from 1808 until March 1812,30 and Catherwood claimed that he had acquired a large fortune as a result of over three years' concentrated embezzling. He evidently believed that his pay was insufficient, for he applied for an extra allowance in 1810, but the members of the medical board replied that it was not possible. As they wrote, "we must lament that the arduous duties so meritoriously executed by that officer are thus inadequately rewarded. But the regulations of the treasury confine the pay of a purveyor to twenty shillings a day, and when anything beyond that rate ... has been granted, it was done "Audit Office/14/30/p. 144. 27 Catherwood, op. cit., note 1 above, p. 9.
I' Audit Office/10/32/p. 229. 29 on the particular authority of the general commanding that station."'3' When the army was so short of money, however, Wellington was unlikely to endorse Gunson's request for an increase in pay, so the idea was dropped in favour of unofficial ways of making money. Much of Gunson's wealth resulted from his association with a Portuguese merchant called Lewis Moreira, whom he ordered to supply all the hospitals, whether in Lisbon or farther up-country. A witness examined at Abrantes said that "the intimacy was so great that it was generally repeated that they decided the profits between them, the purveyor blindly approved whatever Lewis Moreira determined,"32 and he even said that Moreira had once told him "that if he could not agree well with the purveyor in charge at Abrantes, to let him know and that he would have him sent away, as he had already done with two others."3 Actual proof that Gunson was directly concerned in defrauding the government can be found in the testimony of Gregorio SimOens, a merchant's son, who was taken to the Estrela hospital "where were present two English officers whom he very well knew to be Messrs. Bacon and Gunson".34 He was presented with several receipts and asked to sign them, but when he demurred "by reason of his not knowing what they were [Moreira] told him to sign them as there was no danger whatever in so doing, which the said Bacon and Gunson likewise intimated by gestures, desiring him to sign the papers."35 Gunson also adjusted the stoppage accounts to his own benefit: it was calculated after the war that he had pocketed the money for 45,123 diets for fictitious patients in Lisbon alone." The average cost of each diet is unknown, but their number indicates the scale upon which his operations were conducted.
The total sum embezzled by Gunson is also unknown-the auditor-general spoke of "very large remittances ... to England ... which were most satisfactorily brought home to him",37 and the commissioners for audit mentioned many thousands of pounds. An anonymous writer declared in 1850 that Gunson had amassed a fortune of £65,000, and although this cannot be confirmed it is certainly possible.38
According to Catherwood, Gunson was assisted by two clerks named Francis Bishop and Edward Fairman, who lost few chances of feathering their own nests. Bishop had been engaged in examining the provision accounts at Lisbon, but he was given leave of absence early in 1812 because Gunson was retiring (ostensibly from ill health) and needed someone to help with the task of arranging all his accounts for submission to 
28
T. B. Catherwood and the medical department of Wellington's army he took over the the accounts of the station at Vitoria and refused to share the profits with his colleague Copeland, saying "you will perhaps think it strange that during the last three months I have retained the whole of the surplus, but you should consider that for a long time I have been settling accounts in the rear, where I have had no opportunity of making anything." 39 Catherwood shows that a talent for conspicuous consumption was well developed in purveyor's clerk Fairman, describing him as "a man of most dissolute manners and the most profligate profusion; he played deeply, drank hardly (a bottle of champaign [sic] to tune his nerves before rising from bed) and he kept three girls, with all of whom he slept together."40 Fairman's morals were his own affair, but no harem could be run on a clerk's wages of five shillings a day, still less on extended credit, and it was the application of public money to private pleasure which made him an undesirable government servant. Nor was Catherwood exaggerating: the auditors admitted after the war that many objections could be made to Fairman's character, but that he was such a valuable source of information that his defects should be overlooked, and he was employed in their office to discover evidence of fraud in the purveyors' accounts. Fairman's only attractive feature was his handwriting.
Catherwood worked under George Dickson,41 Gunson's successor, so he gives much more detail as to his misconduct, and these accusations have also been substantiated by independent authorities. Appointed in January 1812, Dickson was apparently chosen to put a stop to the fraud which was suspected but never actually proved during the war. However, by the time he left in October 1813, he had not only carried on embezzling, but had adjusted the regulations so as to make it easier for himself and thus for his subordinates. The chief example of such manipulation can be seen in the matter of the sick maintenance accounts. Regulations stated that at the end of the month the principal medical officer of a hospital station would appoint a board of three medical officers whose duty it was to certify "it has examined the Return and compared it with the daily diet abstracts, and ... it finds that the Diet and Extras therein stated to have been issued to the patients and servants in His Majesty's general hospital, conformably to the prescription of the attendant medical director."42 Dickson had the words "and compared with the daily diet abstracts" struck out, by arguing that "while the return referred to other vouchers, it was not a complete voucher in itself, and that the Commissioners for Accounts might hereafter demand the daily abstracts which would cause inconvenience, on account of their number, and the slovenly manner in which they are written."43 This was true, but it also meant that quantities could be inflated and written down in the return with much 
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Kate Crowe remarking that "he had summed it himself, but doubted his accuracy because the amount of it was so considerable."" Between September and October 1812, he had managed to create a profit of 22,000 dollars, the equivalent of £6,937 10s. Od., and on top of this was the milk surplus: 540 pints had been consumed, but vouchers had been obtained for 15,650 pints, so that he pocketed another £288.45 A similar situation occurred at Vizeu, under deputy-purveyor Smyth, and the board of general officers there not unnaturally felt that some of the quantities stated were excessive, and that the clerk had made a mistake. But Dickson forced them to sanction the return, shouting "what do you know of accounts? You have nothing to do but to sign your names. As for you, Mr. Power [the staff surgeon] you are drunk at the moment, and if you give me any more trouble I will put you in arrest."46
Dickson's avarice often led him to defraud his subordinates as well as the government; at Ciudad Rodrigo, for example, deputy-purveyor Findlay was ill, but when Dickson went to visit him, he took away all his papers and settled the account, keeping the surplus of 3,000 dollars (£675) for himself. The clerks, for their part, resented the loss of their perquisites, and formulated ways of cheating Dickson to benefit themselves. Deputy-purveyor Copeland (apparently a relative of McGrigor) was peculiarly successful at this, and was reputed to pay his confidential clerks, Sherrin and Atkins, 400 dollars (£90) each a month.
Lest it seem that Catherwood was allowing his dislike for Dickson to colour his imagination, it should be remembered that the purveyor-general was found to have claimed stoppages for 146,657 fictitious patients at Lisbon alone;47 and that although he was in the Peninsula less time than Gunson, he is supposed to have acquired a private fortune of £95,000.48
When Dickson left in October 1813, he was succeeded by purveyor William James, who served in that capacity until the end of the war. Catherwood had a number of interesting things to say about James, of whom little information is otherwise known.
McGrigor had the highest opinion of James, and declared that "a man of higher honour, more unspotted integrity, abler as an officer or more amiable in any quality as a man does not exist in any department of the army."49 Catherwood admitted his amiability, but complained that he was not an efficient head of department. Dickson, for all his faults, had been an industrious man, and had kept his four clerks very busy, but James lacked decision and neglected his correspondence. As Catherwood recalled, "he appeared to dread the very sight of a paper, and it was with the greatest difficulty I could obtain his signature: frequently matters of some consequence were delayed for the want of it."50 James also forgot to requisition account books for headquarters, and refused to sanction the purchase of 
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T. B. Catherwood and the medical department of Wellington's army clerks were unable "to keep the account of money advanced to the purveyor in proper form, and the greater part of the time which the army spent in winter quarters, so necessary for the arrangement of accounts, was absolutely lost. The quarterly return of stores of the 20 November 1813 was not made up until the 20 February 1814."51
It was just as well that the war ended before the effects of the delay could be felt. James's alleged lack of administrative skill is borne out by post-war events: the medical board refused to sanction various sections of his accounts because they were not supported by the correct vouchers, and it was only with the help of McGrigor that their informality was finally rectified. 52 Catherwood's belief that James also encouraged dishonesty does not seem to have any basis in fact-it is far more likely that in his willingness to delegate he mistakenly gave too much responsibility to venal subordinates such as George Pratt. It should be pointed out in defence of James, that when McGrigor wrote his autobiography, after Gunson and Dickson had been dismissed, he saw no reason to change his view of James, but said that "although I believe nearly half a million pounds had passed through his hands, not a shilling of it stuck to them. So strictly honest was that gentleman, that with a large family, he found difficulty in living in London, and it took years of repeated applications through the Duke of Wellington to obtain the addition of four shillings to the half-pay which he could claim on retirement from the shortest service."53 And in all the investigations which the auditor-general carried out, no mention ever seems to have been made of James, and it seems most unlikely that anything suspicious in his behaviour would have escaped detection. Catherwood's accusations were probably derived from an unwillingness to extend the benefit of the doubt to one whom he thought had deprived him of promotion. James and Catherwood had not worked together easily-Catherwood had probably shown his contempt for James's lack of method rather too openly, whereas James must have found his clerk's air of overworked, martyred duty very irritating.
It will be asked what effect this systematic peculation had upon the army and the medical department in particular. It C Kate Crowe sick of having to wait for shipments from the Tagus was obvious, but Freitas' second claim should be taken with a pinch of salt, as he had been cheated by Moreira, and was owed "more than 200 milreis" (over £56).5 It should also be remembered that such widespread corruption resulted in a strained atmosphere between the medical men and some of the purveyors: the former became suspicious of the latter, who in turn established themselves as a separate clique instead of being assimilated into the administrative team.
In view of such suspicions, it is remarkable that fraud was allowed to continue so long unchecked. When McGrigor came out to the Peninsula in January 1812, he had orders to investigate stories that there had been great waste and profusion in the purveyor's and apothecary's departments," and Wellington gave him some anonymous letters on the subject which had arrived a few weeks before. Even so, McGrigor could find nothing more than a tendency to extravagance, and the deterioration of goods kept in store too long. Towards the end of the war, however, he could not help being aware that the situation had grown worse: in a circular letter to the principal medical officers of hospital stations, he said "the accounts of the peculations committed in the general hospitals of this country have even reached England, and I have received several communications on the subject .... It is stated to me that at some hospital stations, robbery and peculation have become so familiar that the sense of the criminality of such conduct has been lost.... I cannot help thinking,56 he went on, that if the gentlemen of the purveyor's department discharged their duty more zealously, robbery and peculation from the stores could not take place."57 This letter shows that although McGrigor recognized that something was wrong, he had no idea of how the fraud was being perpetrated-he was thinking of schemes to cheat the government of stores already bought and paid for, whereas the most money was being made from fictitious transactions carried out at purveyor and deputy-purveyor level.
Medical men who worked in closer contact with the purveyors, such as staffsurgeon (later deputy-inspector) G. J. Guthrie, had a better idea of what was going on, but they were themselves so busy that they had no time to investigate it. Paperwork already swallowed up too much time, they were always short of staff, and thus they could not afford to carry out the close scrutiny of accounts which was the only way to check fraud. Nor had they any real reason to interfere with the purveyors unless they failed in the essential duty of providing food and supplies for the sick-a rare occurrence. Neglect of that duty was immediately obvious and retribution correspondingly swift-at San Sebastian, for example, deputy-purveyor Hardy was placed under arrest and court-martialled for disobeying orders and feeding the sick on salt meat and biscuit.
It should be emphasized that the venal purveyors were very clever in staving off 67 Ibid.
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T. B. Catherwood and the medical department of Wellington's army deputies in charge of hospital stations ... when apprehensive of committing himself by too much personal interference."58 This was found by the commissioners to be true-the washerwoman Maria Rita, for example, said that it was Pratt who encouraged her to sign the fictitious receipts at Lisbon.5'
Nor did Dickson draw attention to himself by a display of wealth: Catherwood said he was thought to have sent £10,000 to England by means of bills purchased in Oporto by one of his clerks, and at the beginning of 1813, to have deposited another £5,000 with a merchant in Lisbon. The commissioners were able to trace many such transactions back to Dickson, and they formed the chief evidence against him, as with no private income he could scarcely have accumulated such sums honestly. Catherwood also explains another factor which worked in Dickson's favour. He said that the department was given the job of paying the wages of the officers of the hospital staff of the army, and that although Dickson grumbled outwardly about the extra work this entailed, he was secretly delighted, as it would afford a plausible "explanation of an apparent advance of money from general hospital accounts, or of any remittances to England which might come to light."60 Evidence in the McGrigor papers shows that the purveyors were indeed requested to pay the general hospital staff, as well as the servants, owing to the difficulty and delay which had been experienced when orthodox paymasters had to travel round to the various stations.6
Dickson's ever-present concern to cover his tracks is well illustrated by this story from Catherwood: when the scarcity of money was at its height in 1813, Dickson had so much wealth that he was afraid that after his accounts with the treasury should be stated, it might be seen that he had spent more than he had received at the time. Thus, "in order to prevent the bad impression which such an appearance would make, he pretended to have borrowed a considerable sum from a commercial house in Lisbon, on his own personal credit and security, in order to employ it for the public service".62 Some of his deputies appear to have equalled his skill in dissimulation: Macpherson at Vera told the clerk with whom he shared his profits to ride over to headquarters, plead penury, and ask Hodges (one of the senior purveyors but an honest man) for "two weeks wages in advance-it would look well."63
To draw suspicion away from himself, Dickson frequently complained of the calibre of his subordinates in general, yet he never initiated proceedings against anyone. When an independent investigation threatened ruin, declared gate",67 and on the 31 March 1813, McGrigor informed the medical board in London that "deputy purveyor Cooper against whom charges for peculation were adduced, has absented himself from this service without leave."68 It might be said that McGrigor was at fault in being totally mistaken in his estimate of Dickson's character. Catherwood shows that Wellington had a poor opinion of Dickson, but McGrigor, although he "always knew that Dr. Dickson was a man of a bad temper and of a tyrannical disposition, yet . .. thought him an honest man",69 and defended him against Wellington's complaints. At Lesaca, for example, late in 1813, the case of deputy-purveyor Hardy's neglect of duty was followed by the insubordination of deputy-purveyor Saunders, and these two incidents reinforced Wellington's belief that Dickson was unfitted for his situation: it seems that only the support of McGrigor prevented his dismissal. It was a pity, however, that McGrigor trusted Dickson, for the task of stamping out abuses was left to the initiative of the departmental head, who had no intention of doing any such thing.
On the other hand, Dickson projected a very clever simulation of honesty, which McGrigor could hardly have seen through when their acquaintance was an official relationship of letters, reports and occasional meetings. And as Dickson's demeanour satisfied McGrigor, it was natural to leave him to manage his department: interference would have savoured of lack of confidence, and in any case, McGrigor was far too busy, like the staff-surgeons at general hospital level, to duplicate the work that had been delegated to others. All he could do was to "mark strongly the conduct of undeserving officers"70 when they came his way. McGrigor defended Dickson because it was always his policy to give "uniform support"'7' to well-meaning subordinates, and he thought Dickson was doing this best under very unfavourable circumstances.
Catherwood's revelations are so detailed and comprehensive that it is natural to suppose that he was directly and chiefly responsible for the detection of Gunson's and Dickson's crimes. On closer examination, however, it is obvious that the part he played was relatively small. He first approached McGrigor in February 1816, and offered to disclose all he knew in return for promotion, but the auditor-general had already arrived in Portugal and had begun to examine the merchant Moreira and other witnesses in July 1815. These investigations revealed anomalies and sowed disquiet in the minds of the authorities quite independently of anything said by Catherwood. It is interesting to note how the auditor-general was sent to Lisbon in the first place. C. M. Clode declared that when statutory power was conferred upon the comptrollers (a branch of the treasury) for the examination of army accounts, such savings were effected by them in military expenditure that the government decided to appoint a fourth comptroller "with a separate establishment to act with the Army abroad, and to exercise powers still more extensive than those which were entrusted to his
